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On the Competition Enhancing Effects of Exclusive Dealing Contracts
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Pages 429-437
Markus Reisinger
exclusive contracts, contract breach, antitrust policy
Simulation as a tool for merger assessment: benefits and limitations
Workshop for the Polish Competition Law Association, Warsaw, 11 April 2013.
simulation, merger
Vertical effects when assessing passive minority shareholdings
E.CA Compact
minority shareholdings, vertical effects

While the discussion among economists on passive minority shareholdings focusses on horizontal unilateral as well as coordinated effects of such acquisitions, in some cases the main concerns of market participants are of a vertical nature. When analysing such vertical effects one needs to account for the fact that the acquirer does not gain control over the strategic decisions of the target precluding certain foreclosure strategies. This allows a more focussed review of competitive effects.


PDF icon Vertical effects when assessing passive minority shareholdings
Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, June 2012, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 177-201
Tomaso Duso
competition, mobile telecommunications
Competition policy and public interests: an economic perspective (in Dutch)
Markt & Mededinging, October 2012, nr. 4, pp. 149- 156
Paul de Bijl
competition policy


Only competition is relevant for the new Authority Consumer and Market " (in Dutch)
Me Judice, 25 September 2012
Paul de Bijl
competition, market power


New cartel watchdog has to show its teeth (in Dutch)
Het Financieele Dagblad, 9 October 2012
Paul de Bijl


Economics to Detect Collusion : The Hunt for the Perfect Benchmark
10th ACE Annual Conference, Paris, 26 October 2012.
dominance, efficiences, survey
Vertical coordination through renegotiation
International Journal of Industrial Organization 30(6): 553–563

This paper analyzes the strategic use of bilateral supply contracts in sequential negotiations between one manufacturer and two differentiated retailers.

View the external abstract
Implications of the State Aid Modernisation for the Assessment of Large Investment Projects
EStAL - Issue: 1/2013 - pp. 46-60.
competition policy, regional state aid, subsidies, anti-competitive effects

The Regional Aid Guidelines foresee specific screens for an in-depth assessment of Large Investment Projects (LIPs): an in-depth assessment is initiated if the market share of the aid beneficiary is above 25% or the investment results in a capacity expansion above 5% in a declining market. It is currently being discussed within the broader State Aid Modernization package and also due to a recent court ruling on the case Propapier whether these market screens should stay as they are. Based on a dataset of all LIP cases notified under the 2006 Regional Aid Guidelines, we evaluate those market screens and find that the screens do have the power to identify problematic cases – cases with a below average expected aid effectiveness and aid measures targeting specific industries. We also find, however, that the market screens are affected by a severe implementation problem and, hence, do not help to shorten phase I investigations. From a conceptual perspective, they are also not capable of identifying some of the potentially most problematic regional State aid cases. Policy options are discussed.

The full paper can be purchased here.

A working paper version is available here.