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Comments on Sector Inquiries and Joint Ventures
Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht, 27 February 2013, Berlin.
2013
joint venture, sector enquiries
Regional Aid - Observations on Welfare and Entrepreneurs
ERA State Aid Conference, 15 November 2013, Trier.
2013
welfare, regional aid, state aid
Standard of Proof for Economic Evidence in Competition Cases
IBC Competition Economics 2013, London, 25 April 2013.
2013
economic evidence, standard of proof
Dominant and Efficient – On the Relevance of Efficiencies in Abuse of Dominance Cases
Hal White Antitrust Conference, June 3/4, 2013.
2013
antitrust policy, efficiency defence, predatory pricing

Abstract : The European Commission’s policy on the relevance of efficiency considerations in abuse of dominance cases (Article 102 TFEU) has not been resolved satisfactorily. In an attempt to give guidance on this matter, we address the topic from two different angles: First, we review EC soft law provisions and recent decisions. Based on this review, we find that efficiency defences play a limited role under the current practice. They are of relevance in the growing number of IT related cases but only in these. Second, we explore – in the example of low price strategies – business practitioners’ views on the relevance of the pro and anti-competitive motives. Based on a survey of EMBA students, we find that low price strategies are indeed frequently used. The motives are diverse however, often pro-competitive and in line with antitrust compliance, i.e. low price strategies are rarely considered advisable for leading firms. Finally, policy conclusions are drawn.

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Pricing payment cards
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5(3): 206–231
Emilio Calvano
2013

Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees to cardholders' banks, on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's
profi t-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, over-subsidizing card usage and over-taxing merchants.

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The Handbook of Competition Economics 2014 - Germany (country chapter)
Global Competition Review.
Lars Wiethaus
2013
handbook, 8th Amendment, competition

"An extract from The Handbook of Competition Economics 2014 - www.GlobalCompetitionReview.com"

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On the Competition Enhancing Effects of Exclusive Dealing Contracts
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 31, Issue 5, Pages 429-437
Markus Reisinger
2013
exclusive contracts, contract breach, antitrust policy
Simulation as a tool for merger assessment: benefits and limitations
Workshop for the Polish Competition Law Association, Warsaw, 11 April 2013.
2013
simulation, merger
Vertical effects when assessing passive minority shareholdings
E.CA Compact
2013
minority shareholdings, vertical effects

While the discussion among economists on passive minority shareholdings focusses on horizontal unilateral as well as coordinated effects of such acquisitions, in some cases the main concerns of market participants are of a vertical nature. When analysing such vertical effects one needs to account for the fact that the acquirer does not gain control over the strategic decisions of the target precluding certain foreclosure strategies. This allows a more focussed review of competitive effects.

 

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Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, June 2012, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 177-201
Tomaso Duso
2012
competition, mobile telecommunications

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